). The outcome of the plan would be contingent on the ex post realization of whether the buyer will shop in the Home DM or in the Foreign DM. For simplicity, assume that the probability of a match between a buyer and a seller in both Home and Foreign DM is identical and given by σ.
Given a commitment to the plan (ω, ω � ), and before the DM opens, the buyer then decides on his counterfeiting mixed strategy, (η, η f ) := (η(ω, ω � ), η f (ω, ω � )). As in the main paper, the buyer conditions his strategy on his beliefs about a Home (or Foreign) and the seller's probability of accepting his payment,π +1 := π +1 (ω, ω � ) (orπ �,+1 :=π �,+1 (ω, ω � )). From a seller's point of view, the Home (or Foreign) seller will ex-post play a mixed strategy π +1 := π +1 (ω) (or π �,+1 := π �,+1 (ω � )).
A1. DM-buyers and DM-sellers
Since the model does not have aggregate uncertainty and agents have perfect foresight, let us re-write the game and work backwards from a DM(t) and then to a preceding date's CM(t − 1). Given a fixed strategy (ω, ω � , η, η f ), which is determined at the end of the preceding CM, the induced beginning-of-DM value to a buyer with portfolio (a, a f ) is given by
Since DM sellers are do not face a probability of being relocated, the seller's problem is the same as that in the main paper. The difference now is that in each period a Home (Foreign) DM-seller may end up meeting with either a Home or a Foreign DM-buyer. Nevertheless, the seller's optimal strategy will still be the same given any buyer's offer.
After some algebra, and as a consequence of quasilinearity of all agent's perperiod payoff functions, in the last stage of the counterfeiting-bargaining game (in the Home DM(t)), the seller maximizes expected profit by playing a mixed strategy π such that
taking as given a buyer's offer ω and the seller's beliefs about the buyer's counterfeiting probabilities, (η,η f ). One can also write down a corresponding problem for a Foreign DM seller where the mixed strategy is denoted by π � :
Note that since the law of one price holds in terms of the CM good, the Foreign seller's problem equivalently yields,
In the penultimate stage, in CM(t − 1), the buyer chooses the counterfeiting
and the equilibrium is unique.
One can also write a symmetric characterization for the corresponding Foreign country. The intuitive explanation of this resulting characterization, and in particular, its endogenous liquidity constraints are similar to that in the main paper. Below we provide the detailed proof of this result. Note that by setting ξ = 1, we also have the proof of Proposition 1. A similar proof for this special case discussed in the main paper can also be found in our working paper Gomis-Porqueras, Kam and Waller (2015) .
PROOF:
Denote the maximum value of the program in (A6), whenπ = π = 1,π � = π � = 1, and (η,η
The aim is to show that an equilibrium strategy yields the same value as (U b ) * , and it satisfies the characterization in Proposition 5 (Case 1); and that any other candidate strategy under beliefsπ � = 1, π � � = 1, and/or (η,η f ) � = (1, 1) will induce a buyer's valuation that is strictly less than (U b ) * , and therefore cannot constitute an equilibrium (Cases 2-5).
Consider the subgame following an offer plan (ω, ω � ). Let ρ(χ, χ f ) denote the joint probability measure on events {(χ, χ f )}, where the pure actions over counterfeiting are (χ, χ f ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 . Denote P := 2 {0,1} 2 as the power set of {0, 1} 2 . By the definition of probability measures, it must be that � {z}∈P ρ(z) = 1.
Consider the subgame where we have reached the seller's problem. At this stage, the event of a particular buyer going to the Foreign DM, or staying in the Home DM, is already realized. Therefore, without loss, let us focus on a DM-seller's problem in the Home DM. The seller's problem in (9) is equivalent to:
This is a linear programming problem in π, given the seller's rational belief system ρ and buyer's offer ω. Thus the seller's best response satisfies:
We can also write down a similar characterization for an ex-post Foreign DM seller who meets a Home buyer. The conclusion would be the same.
Now consider the preceding stage, where a buyer has already committed to some travel-contingent plan of offer (ω, ω � ), i.e., before the buyer knows which DM (Home or Foreign) he has to travel to. At this stage, a buyer is deciding on counterfeiting choices and has to compare alternative payoffs from mixing over pure counterfeiting strategies. We will need to define some convenient notation here:
denote the buyer's expected payoff from realizing pure actions (χ h , χ f ), given offer ω and rational belief systemπ,π � ∈ [0, 1], where {z} ∈ P . From the pure counterfeiting strategy induced payoffs, we can construct those arising from non-degenerating mixed strategies below.
We have the following possible payoffs following each non-empty (pure-strategy)
counterfeiting event {z} ∈ P :
Observe that
There are five cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose there is a set of candidate equilibria such that ρ(0, 0) = 1 and ρ(z) = 0, for all {z} ∈ P and z � = (0, 0). Then, we have U b
, and,
where m = d and m f = d f . (Since inflation is costly, and since utility is quasilinear, the portfolio (m, m f ) is such that the balance carried into the DM is exactly equivalent to the value of payments offered by the buyer's plan.)
The interpretation from (A14) and (A15) is that the liquidity constraints on either currencies are slack. Therefore the buyer's expected payoff in this case can be evaluated from (A9). Ifπ < 1 orπ � < 1, then from the Home or Foreign seller's decision rule (A8), or its Foreign equivalent, we can deduce ω ≡ (q, d, d f ) and ω � ≡ (q � , d, d f ) must be such that the seller's participation/incentive constraint binds. That is, if it is the Home seller, then
If it is the Foreign seller who will be the Home buyer in the DM, then
Since (A16) or (A17) must hold ex post, all we need to do is verify the buyer's payoff. Since, the buyer's liquidity constraints (A14) and (A15) do not bind at π < 1 and/orπ � < 1, a small increment in either payment offered, d or d f if the buyer shops at Home, and d � or d f,� if the buyer shops abroad, relaxes (A16) and (A17). This serve to raiseπ andπ � -i.e., the buyer's rational belief that sellers in either contingency will be more likely to accept his offer-and thus the buyer's payoff (A9). The maximal payoff to the buyer, keeping the seller in participation, is when the sellers' best responses are consistent with the buyer's belief system: π =π = 1 and π � =π � = 1, and the offer plan (ω, ω � ) is such that
Then it is easily verified that this maximal value coincides with the maximum value of the program given in (A6) in Proposition 5, i.e. U b = (U b ) * , since the payoff function is continuous, and the constraints also define a nonempty, compact subset of the feasible set. Since a seller has no incentive to deviate from π = 1 or π � = 1, then a behavior strategy (ω,
Case 2. Note that in any equilibrium, a seller will never accept an offer if ρ(1, 1) = 1, and, a buyer will never counterfeit both assets with probability 1-counterfeiting for sure costs κ + κ f and the buyer gains nothing. Therefore, ρ(1, 1) < 1 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium in the subgame following ω. Likewise, all unions of disjoint events with this event of counterfeiting all assets-i.e. {(χ, χ f )} ∈ {(0, 1)} ∪ {(1, 1)} or {(χ, χ f )} ∈ {(1, 0)} ∪ {(1, 1)}-such that ρ(0, 1) + ρ(1, 1) = 1 or ρ(1, 0) + ρ(1, 1) = 1, respectively, cannot be on any equilibrium path.
Case 3. Suppose instead we have equilibria in which ρ(0, 0) + ρ(1, 0) = 1, ρ(1, 0) � = 0, and ρ(1, 1)+ρ(0, 1) = 0, so
Given this case, and from (A13), we have U b
{(0,0)} , and (A9) and (A11), respectively, we have:
and,
Ifπ < 1, then from the Home seller's decision rule (A8) we can deduce ω ≡ (q, d, d f ) must be such that the seller's participation/incentive constraint binds:
Likewise, ifπ � < 1, then a Foreign seller's participation constraint will be binding.
The buyer's payoff can be evaluated from (A11). Ifπ < 1 and/orπ � < 1, then reducing d infinitesimally will increaseπ in (A18), and this uniformly increases the buyer's payoff in (A11). The buyer would like to attainπ =π � = 1 since the sellers' participation constraint will still be respected:
Let the maximum of the buyer's TIOLI value (A11) such that the constraints (A18), (A19) and (A21) are respected, in this case be (U b ) † . However, since ρ(1, 0) � = 0, it is easily verified that
in which the last equality is attained when ρ(1, 0) = 0. This contradicts the claim that ρ(0, 0) + ρ(1, 0) = 1 and ρ(1, 0) � = 0 is a component of a PBE. Case 4. Suppose there are equilibria consisting of ρ(0, 0) + ρ(0, 1) = 1 with ρ(0, 1) � = 0, and ρ(1, 0) = ρ(1, 1) = 0. The buyer's payoff is such that U b
Given this assumption, we have from (A13) that U b {(1,0)} = U b {(1,1)} . From (A9) and (A10), we can derive
From the case that U b {(0,0)} > U b {(1,0)} and (A9)-(A11), we have:
. The buyer's payoff can be evaluated from (A10). Ifπ < 1 orπ � < 1, from (A8), we can deduce that the Home seller's participation constraint is binding. Again, the same goes for the Foreign seller. Ifπ < 1, then reducing d f infinitesimally will increase these acceptance probabilities in (A22) and thusπ; and this serves to increase the buyer's payoff in (A10). The buyer would like to attainπ =π � = 1 since the sellers' participation constraint will still be respected at that point:
Let the maximum of the buyer's TIOLI value (A10) such that the constraints (A22), (A23) and (A24) are respected, in this case be ( Case 5. Suppose a candidate equilibrium is such that � {z}∈P ρ(z) = 1, ρ(z) � = 0 for all {z} ∈ P , and that U b
Then from (A10) and (A12), and from (A11) and (A12), respectively, we can derive
If the payment offered (d, d f ) are such thatπ < 1 orπ � < 1, then from the seller's decision rule (A8) we can deduce ω ≡ (q, d, d f ) and ω ≡ (q � , d, d f ) must be such that the Home seller's participation/incentive constraint binds:
Likewise, for a Foreign seller. However, the buyer can increase his expected payoff in (A12) by reducing both (d, d * ), thus raisingπ andπ � in (A25) while still ensuring that the sellers participate, untilπ =π � = 1, where
Let the maximum of the buyer's TIOLI value (A12) such that the constraints (A25) and (A27) are respected, in this case be (
in which the last equality is attained when ρ(0, 0) = 1. This contradicts the claim that � {z}∈P ρ(z) = 1, ρ(z) � = 0 for all {z} ∈ P , is a component of a PBE.
Summary. From Cases 1 to 5, we have shown that the only mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame following an offer ω must be one such that �ρ(0, 0), π� = �1, 1�, and that the offer ω satisfies the program in (A6) in Proposition 5.
Finally, since u(.) and −c(.) are strictly concave functions and the inequality constraints in program (A6) define a convex feasible set, the program (A6) has a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 2
For λ = λ f > 0 the solution to the buyer's problem is given by
Equation (B1) shows the real balances are the same and equal to the liquidity bounds. Given these solutions, (B2) yields the solution forq. The last three are the solutions for the multipliers. Finally, to solve for m and m f we use the market clearing conditions
In an equilibrium where the two countries are identical in every respect, buyers in each country face the same liquidity constraints. Thus we have φm = φm = κ/ (Π − β(1 − σ)). It then follows that m = M/2, m f = M f /2. Substituting these expressions into (B1) yields
, and, e = M M f .
The only thing that is left to do is choose parameter values such that the solutions are valid. From (B5) we needq < q * . As a result, the solution from (B2) forq must satisfy this restriction. Since q * is independent of κ and Π, it is clear that this condition is satisfied for a sufficiently small cost of counterfeiting and/or a sufficiently high inflation rate.
Proof of Proposition 3
For this equilibrium the solution to the buyer's problem yields
, and, µ = Π − β.
In this case,q is pinned down by the first equation. The second equation then gives us the total real value of the buyer's currency portfolio. Using the second equation for both countries, in conjunction with the currency market clearing conditions, we obtain φ
which gives us one equation in two unknowns, φ and e. Thus, for any value of φ there is a nominal exchange rate that solves this expression. As a result, the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate.
Proportional Bargaining Trading Protocol
Let us consider an alternative trading protocol: The proportional bargaining solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) . The buyer now proposes ω := (q +1 , d +1 , d f +1 ) and commit to ω before making any (C, N ) decisions in CM(t). Note that the underlying private information problem faced by the seller is still present under this new trading protocol. This is the case as the seller still can not differentiate between genuine and counterfeited currencies.
